This article seeks to understand the demands of the security sector in Latin America, in the context of reforms promoted by international aid agencies in the region. The hypothesis of this study is that international aid programs focused 
countries (TUCHIN and GOLDING, 2003; ZIEGLER and NIELD, 2002) and the imposition of agendas that are disconnected from local organizational, institutional and cultural contexts (BAYLEY, 2005; DONAIS, 2012; PEAKE and MARENIN, 2008) .
Some studies also point to a degree of resistance on the part of these agencies to deal with issues related directly to law enforcement organizations (BAYLEY, 2006; HAMMERGREN, 2003; LEEDS, 2007) , despite these being the institutions that are legally responsible for fighting crime in the region.
Researchers also criticize SSR programs for their top-down approach, which creates a gap between policy and practice. Blair (2014) explains that since 1998 the tendency within SSR has been to implement ideas from the global North to local environments in the global South that lack the necessary legal, institutional and administrative resources. This inevitably creates difficulties for the development community (BACKER and SCHEYE, 2007, p. 509, apud BLAIR, 2014, p. 103) . In the foreign aid literature, criticism of project officers' distance from and lack of knowledge of target countries' institutions is hardly new. Easterly (2002) states that foreign aid agencies place enormous demands on poor countries with limited administrative capacity and weak institutions. This view is shared by Berg (2000) , for whom the failure to reform political institutions in recipient countries may reflect the inability of donors to adapt programs and practices to the circumstances of low-income countries where administrative capacity is weaker. (2) e0005 -4/30 international agencies for development cooperation. My hypothesis is that SSR programs funded by such agencies in Latin America are generic and disconnected from local agendas in the field.
The remainder of the paper is divided as follows: in the next section, I
present key documents that outline the local agenda for SSR in Latin America; I then present an overview of the history of SSR programs funded by the development community; finally, in the last two sections, I provide a comparative analysis between the activities of major donors in relation to key challenges in the region. This paper is the product of ongoing research. As such, in the final section, I
present partial conclusions and identify questions for further research.
Latin American demands and international programs in SSR
The security sector reform agenda in Latin America
In mapping the challenges for Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Latin America, I began by considering regional organizations that would be most representative in their proposals for the sector. After a preliminary analysis of active regional organizations, I selected five based on the availability of data and the degree to which they had discussed the issue  the Union of South American
States (UNASUR), the Organization of American States (OAS), the Andean Community (CAN), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) 2 . UNASUR, CAN, CARICOM and OAS have specific bodies that deal with security issues 3 , and have produced a large amount of ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 2 To ensure the mapping of Latin American regional organizations was comprehensive, I also included in the initial search the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), the Organization of Central American States (ODECA), the Central American Integration System (SICA), the Secretariat of Central American Economic Integration (SIECA), the Central American Common Market (MCCA), the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and the Association of Caribbean States (ACS). However, in the end I excluded these organizations from the analysis, either because I could not find sufficient documentation on their websites relating to security issues or because they did not have specific bodies dealing with security issues and had not signed commitments in this area. improve public security in the region. These points are identified 'by members states themselves', represented by their security ministers. 
The diagnostic
The Public Security Department of the Secretariat for Multidimensional Based on interviews with experts, documentary research, and systematic analysis of the survey conducted with police officers, a list was drawn up of deficiencies within police forces in the Americas. These deficiencies were grouped into the four dimensions detailed in Table 02 .
As we can see, the Consensus of Santo Domingo on Public Security in the Americas and the Diagnostic reach similar conclusions, even if the former is more general and the latter more specific. Understandably, given the purpose of the document and the events which led to its production, the Consensus places greater emphasis on regional cooperation. The Diagnostic, meanwhile, is more detailed, although some of the points raised are somewhat vague and repetitive. In any case, both documents stress the need for the development of technical and managerial skills in the security sector. These key demands may now be compared to the objectives of SSR programs funded by international agencies for development cooperation.
International assistance programs for SSR in Latin America
The history of security sector reform in the OECD
The beginning of the new century saw bilateral and multilateral agencies formally acknowledging domestic security as an important area for development.
Until then, interventions in the security domain were limited to military assistance in conflict zones and state-building. The creation of a secure domestic environment was considered by development actors to be "a primary responsibility of their ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 8 I was given access to a paper copy of the Diagnostic, which was not published by the OAS. that SSR programs will not meet deadlines or work effectively if they are not harmonized with other development programs through a holistic and multisectoral approach.
Since 2009, the OECD has defined SSR programs as support for "law enforcement agencies and the judiciary to assist, review and reform the security system to improve democratic governance and civilian control" (OECD, 2007, The difference between SSR ODA flows to Latin America from the United States and Canada is small  little more than $4 million. However, the difference between these countries and other donors is very pronounced, as we can see in Table 03 . Canada, the second largest donor, spends six times more than Spain in third place. For this reason, coupled with the fact that they were regular donors throughout the period studied, I decided to analyse the United States' and ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 17 Constant price against 2013 baseline. 18 QWIDS is an online search engine for OECD Statistics. Users can select from a set of variables and the QWIDS pulls up information from the OECD Stat, the database of international development statistics. (2018) 12 (2) e0005 -15/30
Canada's SSR programs to Latin America in full. This has allowed me to analyze how their SSR ODA flows are distributed across Latin America in terms of the target countries, the resources allocated, and the nature of the SSR programs.
Multilateral organizations also spend large amounts relative to most country donors, so I also included their flows in the analysis.
Indeed, some interesting articles point to specific differences in the ways bilateral and multilateral aid agencies develop their programs. Maizels and Nissanke (1984) tested whether aid-giving was guided more by donor interests or recipient needs. They found evidence that bilateral aid was mainly guided by donor interests, while multilateral aid was more often guided by recipient needs. Dollar and Levin (2006) examined the extent to which foreign aid donors, both bilateral and multilateral, could be said to be 'selective' in targeting countries that observe democratic norms and the rule of law. They found that multilateral donors were more selective than bilateral ones in this regard. Neumayer (2003) found that recipient countries' human rights records were usually a statistically insignificant factor in terms of aid allocated. However, there were differences between bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, with the latter showing greater concern about human rights. We may also speculate that Canada and the US have different motivations in making SSR donations, since their respective portfolios of recipient countries and the amounts they donate to each differ significantly. As we can see from Table A01 and Table A02 Governance related to the security sector appears to be a common concern for both countries. And, indeed, it is also acknowledged as a weakness by the recipient countries in both the documents of the MISPAs and the Diagnostic. The UN funds many more SSR programs in Latin America than the EU and the IADB, but the EU and IADB spend much more money. In other words, the UN prefers to spread its ODA budget between numerous small donations, while the EU and the IADB concentrate their ODA flows in a smaller number of large projects in a few countries. This can be seen in Tables A04, A05 and A06 (under Supplementary Material on the BPSR website), which show the distribution of these donations across recipient countries.
As we can see, the three organizations concentrate their resources on Central America, and to some recipient countries in particular. This may relate to the fact that according to UN data on homicide rate (UNODC, 2013) , this region contains the most violent countries in the world. Even the UN, which distributes its donations between a large number of recipient countries, sends the majority (almost 70%) of its SSR flows to Guatemala. SSR ODA flows from the IADB are also quite concentrated, with around 34% going to Honduras. The donations made by the EU, the largest institutional donor to SSR programs in Latin America, are more ______________________________________________________________________________________________ (2018) 12 (2) e0005 -20/30 distributed  Panama receives the largest portion of this funding (31%), but this is not much different from the amounts received by other recipient countries.
It is also interesting to observe that SSR donations by institutional donors are far more homogeneous than those of the country donors. In the three cases, programs related to Citizen Security (youth violence, crime prevention, community policing) received the vast majority of institutional resources  93% in the case of the IADB, 76% for the UN and 79% for EU, as we shown in Tables A07, A08 and A09 (Appendix, under Supplementary Material on the BPSR website).
This data suggests that multilateral organizations really are more sensitive to local agendas than country donors. Challenges related to citizen security and governance, which were the primary themes highlighted by the MISPA documents and the Diagnostic, are also the major concerns of these three organizations judging by how they distributed their donations thematically.
Conclusions
In this there is considerable variation in terms of resources allocated and countries targeted.
At least in the case of country donors, this study appears to support the argument made previously by Marenin (1999) , that foreign assistance reflects donor and advisor priorities: "aid and advice  even when desired by the recipient country, as is generally the case  does not come for free, nor is it silent" (MARENIN, 1999, p. 08) . The expenditures from Canada towards construction and infrastructure in recipient countries, concentrated on Haiti, and from the US on preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in countries such as Argentina  neither of which theme appears as a significant part of the SSR agenda arising from within the region  lead us to conclude that these countries are pursuing other interests. By contrast, multilateral organizations seem rather more attentive to local demands, supporting the argument of Maizels and Nissanke (1984) . At the same time, however, they may be more generic in content, fitting with the findings of Tuchin and Golding (2003) and Ziegler and Nield (2002) .
Although focused specifically on the activities of agencies for international cooperation in the funding and implementation of SSR programs in Latin America, this work fits with the broader literature on international assistance and cooperation. My aim was to provide evidence that could contribute to broader discussions about the activities of Northern donors in Latin America, beyond just the field of SSR. As was mentioned in the introduction, the idea that donors take decisions that do not respond effectively to recipients' needs or institutional conditions is not new in this literature. Neither is it new to argue that multilateral assistance is more attentive than bilateral assistance to recipient countries' needs. 
